The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
games and solutions;
game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium;
the steady state and deductive interpretations;
terminology and notation.
Part 2 Strategic games:
mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium;
rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions;
knowledge and equilibrium.
Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information:
extensive games with perfect information;
complexity considerations in repeated games;
Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information:
extensive games with imperfect information;
Part 5 Coalitional games:
the bargaining set, and the Shapley value;
the Nash solution.
Martin J. Osbore
0262650401 | 9780262650403